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The false panacea of offshore deterrence
information programmes be used to
discourage economic migrants from
setting out on long and dangerous
journeys? And how can the protection
capacities of countries of first asylum
be strengthened so that refugees and
asylum seekers do not feel obliged
to move from one country and
continent to another in order to feel
secure and to meet their basic needs?
In the 1980s, many thousands
of people from Vietnam and
Cambodia set to sea in the hope of
reaching South-East Asian countries
such as Malaysia, Singapore,
the Philippines and Thailand.
To address that movement, the
international community established
a Comprehensive Plan of Action that
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was intended to ensure the welfare of
all these ‘boat people’ and to provide
protection and solutions for those
who qualified for refugee status.
While the circumstances of the current
movement across the Mediterranean
and Atlantic are somewhat different,
a similar approach is now needed,
involving a coherent and interlocking
cluster of measures, agreed to
by countries of origin, transit
and destination and supported
by international organisations
such as UNHCR and IMO.

today is not, in essence, a refugee
situation. But the movement of
people with a need for asylum and
international protection is a feature
of it. It is not an unmanageable
situation and there is scope for action.
It is a problem for individual states
though it has no specific geographical
borders. A comprehensive and
collaborative response offers
the best chance of success.

Conclusion

1. www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?topic_
id=257&doc_id=647
2. www.imo.org/Conventions/contents.asp?doc_
id=653&topic_id=257
3. www.imo.org

The pattern of migration that we
are witnessing in the Mediterranean

Erika Feller is UNHCR’s Assistant
High Commissioner (Protection).
Email: FELLER@unhcr.org

The false panacea of
offshore deterrence
by James C Hathaway
Governments take often shockingly blunt action to deter
refugees and other migrants found on the high seas, in
their island territories and in overseas enclaves. There
is a pervasive belief that when deterrence is conducted
at arms-length from the homeland it is either legitimate
or, at the very least, immune from legal accountability.
For example, the US maintains
that it has no legal obligation to
intercepted refugees, even if they
manage to reach its territorial sea.
Indeed, the US recently argued that a
Cuban asylum seeker – traditionally
a highly favoured group under its
domestic law – could not assert
a right to protection because the
bridge where her tiny boat landed
had been disconnected by storms
from the American mainland.
When some 10,000 persons
managed to reach the Italian
island of Lampedusa this year,
Italy responded by discontinuing
its traditional practice of sending
them to Sicily for processing of
protection claims. Instead, the BBC
reports that the “migrants were
despatched back handcuffed in
military planes from Lampedusa
direct to Libya. No questions asked.”

Spain erected dual razor-wire
fences around its North African
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla to
deter groups of largely sub-Saharan
migrants anxious to enter the
European Union. Even those who
successfully scaled the barriers
were often summarily sent back to
Morocco, which is reported simply
to have dumped them in desert
border zones. The ‘success’ of this
deterrent programme put renewed
pressure on the Spanish Canary
Islands, a favoured destination until
2002 when radar and sea patrols
were instituted to deter travel from
Morocco to the Canarian islands of
Fuerteventura and Lanzarote, some
100 kilometres away. The most recent
flows have thus been forced to take
a much longer and more perilous
route from northern Mauritania to
Tenerife. The Spanish government
has responded to the upsurge in

arrivals by offering Mauritania patrol
boats to stop departures and to set
up refugee camps in Mauritania.

Are such practices legal?
The 1951 Refugee Convention and
its 1967 Protocol do not allow states
to refuse protection to refugees just
because they have not yet entered
the core of its territory. Simply put,
the most basic duties – including
the critical duty of non-refoulement,
requiring states not directly or
indirectly to return refugees to the
risk of persecution – apply wherever
a state exercises jurisdiction. Whether
protection is sought on Lampedusa or
in Rome, the refugee law implications
are identical. It makes no difference
whatever if asylum is claimed by a
refugee clinging to the outermost
razor-wire fence at Ceuta or at a
police station in Madrid. Nor may
there be any peremptory refoulement
of refugees encountered by vessels
patrolling a state’s territorial waters,
or even of those intercepted on the
high seas. Because jurisdiction is
the lynchpin to responsibility, state
parties to the Refugee Convention
must provisionally honour the rights
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of persons under their authority
who claim refugee status until and
unless they are fairly determined
not to qualify for protection.

rickety or grossly overcrowded
vessels, it has been said that
departures must be stopped in
order to avoid risk to life or limb.

Despite the clarity of these legal rules,
two kinds of argument are made
in support of deterrent measures.

There is, however, a critical legal
distinction between sensible efforts
to provide information and to make
it difficult for traffickers to exploit
people on the one hand, and more
aggressive efforts actually to stop
departures on the other. Whatever the
risks, every person has the legal right
to make the decision about departure
for him or herself. The relevant rule
in such cases is not rooted in refugee
law but in the requirement in the
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights1 that all persons
be allowed to leave any country,
including their own. Allegedly
humanitarian steps taken to shut
down escape routes – such as the
formal agreement between the US
and Cuba in 1994 requiring Cuba
to “... take effective measures in
every way it possibly can to prevent
unsafe departures using mainly
persuasive methods” – are unlawful
and paternalistic. It is the refugee’s
right – not the prerogative of any state
or humanitarian agency – to decide
when the risks of staying put are
greater than the risks of setting sail.

The first is that insistence on rigorous
respect for the rules of refugee law
amounts to allowing the proverbial
tail to wag the dog. Because in any
given flow towards the developed
world today refugees are significantly
outnumbered by economic migrants
– whose entry can normally be
lawfully resisted – it is argued that

It is the refugee’s right
to decide when the
risks of staying put
are greater than the
risks of setting sail
governments must be free to respond
effectively to the dominant (nonrefugee) character of the arrivals.
As a matter of law, though, nonselective deterrent measures cannot
be justified where genuine refugees
are part of a mixed flow. There is
no exception to the duty of nonrefoulement for situations in which the
cost or inconvenience of processing
claims is great, or where only one
in ten entrants is actually a refugee.
Nor can states lawfully avoid
refugee protection obligations by
deciding simply not to assess claims
made to them. As UNHCR rightly
insists, a refugee does not become
a refugee because of recognition,
but is recognised because s/he is
a refugee. In practice, this means
that a person who may be a refugee
must be provisionally treated as
such until and unless he or she is
fairly determined not to qualify for
refugee status. Measures which deter
refugee claimants from arriving in
an asylum state are therefore no
less in breach of refugee law than is
the removal of a recognised refugee
already present in a state’s territory.
A second and more complex
argument for deterrence is sometimes
made on humanitarian grounds.
Particularly where refugees and
others arrive by sea, often in

Until and unless the abuse that
causes refugees to flee in the first
place is ended, the only real answer
is to provide safe alternatives to
unsafe routes of escape. While blunt
deterrence of refugee or mixed flows
is unlawful, states are perfectly
free to conceive creative protection
alternatives. Most sensibly, the focus
should be on the establishment of
genuine protection options within
regions of origin. Where intraregional alternatives are truly safe
and accessible and deliver rightsbased protection, it is likely that
most refugees will feel no need to
undertake perilous voyages. Indeed,
where protection options that meet
international legal standards are
declined for economic, social or other
reasons not related to protection,
refugees who travel farther afield may
lawfully be returned to their own
region. For this reason, a re-emphasis
on making real protection available
closer to home should be attractive
to developed states: while less
‘efficient’ than (unlawful) deterrence,
it is, nonetheless, consistent with
their more general migration control

objectives. It is also of real value to
states in regions of origin, which
desperately need binding guarantees
of substantial resources to cope
with endemic refugee flows. Most
critically, it would enhance the
welfare of the overwhelming majority
of refugees not able or willing to
flee beyond their own region.
Discussions along these lines are,
of course, already occurring. There
is clear interest in exploring both
the operational flexibility which
refugee law affords, and the value
of systems to share out both the
responsibilities and burdens inherent
in refugee protection. It is not at all
clear, however, that present initiatives
are based on finding practical ways
by which to respond to involuntary
migration from within a rightsbased framework. Potentially lost
in the discussions as they have
evolved to date is the imperative to
reform the mechanisms of refugee
law not simply to avert perceived
hardships for states but also in
ways that really improve the lot of
refugees themselves. If the net result
of reform is only to lighten the load
of governments, or to renew the
capacity of international agencies to
meet the priorities of states, then an
extraordinary opportunity to advance
the human dignity of refugees
themselves will have been lost.
The challenge, then, is twofold. Most
obviously, we must flatly reject the
legitimacy of generalised deterrence
which can block refugee flight,
including even deterrent measures
prompted by genuine humanitarian
concern. Second, we should embrace
the opportunities which reform of the
mechanisms of refugee law affords
both to save lives now risked in the
flight to asylum and to improve the
quality of protection for all refugees
in the world, wherever located.
James Hathaway is James E and
Sarah A Degan Professor of Law,
and Director of the University of
Michigan’s Program in Refugee and
Asylum Law (www.law.umich.
edu/CentersAndPrograms/pral/
index.htm). His most recent book
is The Rights of Refugees under
International Law, Cambridge,
20052. Email: jch@umich.edu
1. www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html
2. www.cambridge.org/uk/catalogue/catalogue.
asp?isbn=0521542634
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